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Abstract 
This paper reviews the empirical literature on corporate governance and firm 
performance and finds that it has yielded mixed results. The paper argues that a 
primary reason for this situation is that the relevant theories have not been applied to 
the class of phenomena they were designed to explain. In particular, the literature that 
focuses on ownership structure and firm performance employs entrepreneurial agency 
theories of the firm but applies them to managerial firms where ownership is 
separated from control. This is evidenced by the fact that firms in which managerial 
ownership is close to zero percent are included in the samples. Conversely, empirical 
work centered on the relationship between board composition and firm performance 
(which relies on managerial agency theories of the firm) not only does not make sure 
that the firms in their samples are characterized by the separation of ownership and 
control, but it also ignores the alternative managerial agency theory concerning the 
agency costs of free cash flows. Additionally, the paper maintains that other 
approaches, such as that which studies the relationship between indices of anti-
takeover provisions and firm performance, do not rely on any particular theory and for 
this reason are beset by problems of interpretation. The paper concludes with 
recommendations for avoiding the drawbacks and achieving future progress. 
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This paper performs a summary and evaluation of that part of the empirical 
literature in financial economics that studies the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. As it will be seen the main debates in this literature 
have been, for the last three decades, largely motivated by Agency Theory (AT). 
Specifically, while on the one hand a group of researchers have concentrated their 
work around the issue of whether ownership structure is related to firm performance 
in a way that is clearly inspired by the entrepreneurial model of the firm in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), a separate group of researchers have focused their efforts in 
investigating whether certain characteristics of the board of directors are associated to 
firm performance in a way that is visibly motivated by the managerial model in Fama 
and Jensen (1983).  
Empirical work based on both AT perspectives has not been conclusive. There is 
considerable controversy surrounding each of the approaches, with one set of 
researchers arguing that corporate governance affects firm performance, and an 
opposite camp denying this relationship. Thus, while some researchers argue, and find 
empirically, that ownership structure is related to firm performance (Morck et al., 
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Gugler and 
Yortoglu, 2003), others disagree and contend that controlling for an alleged 
endogenous relationship between the two variables there is no such effect, and also 
find empirical support for their position (Demsetz an Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 
1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Coles et al., 2012). On the other hand, while 
some researchers find that the size or composition of the board of directors is related 
to firm performance (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
Yermack, 1996; Callahan et al. 2003; Duchin et al. 2010), others do not find such 
relationships (Fosberg, 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 
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2002). Moreover, in this last literature there is an important debate concerning the 
direction of causality. Particularly, it has been argued that firms react to their realised 
performance by changing the compositions of their boards, and that for this reason it 
is not the case that the causal relationship goes from board composition to specific 
levels of firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 2002). 
The present paper evaluates these two debates by arguing that the conflicting results 
are the consequence of not applying the different AT theories to the class of 
phenomena they were designed to explain. Clearly, logic dictates that entrepreneurial 
AT should be evaluated based on evidence drawn from a sample of entrepreneurial 
firms and, on the other hand, that managerial AT should be tested using a sample of 
managerial firms featuring separation of ownership and control. This paper contends 
that this has not been the case and that this has caused the observed mixed results in 
the literature. 
In addition, this paper reviews a more recent third approach, also related to AT, 
which pays special attention to managerial entrenchment and it is characterized by the 
creation of indices of anti-takeover provisions (Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers and 
Nair, 2005; Core et al., 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2013). The main 
implication of this approach is that entrenched managers can act in their best interests 
without having to worry too much about possible retaliation from the market for 
corporate control. This paper argues that one key problem in this literature is that 
researchers contend that available theory does not provide them with a unambiguous 
prediction of how the key variables employed may be related to each other and thus 
they resort to “asking empirical questions” (see Gompers et al. 2003).  
Finally, this paper examines a fourth approach which is characterized by the use of 
comprehensive lists of corporate governance variables (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
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Beiner et al., 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). This strand of research examines 
empirically how all-encompassing sets of corporate governance variables relate to 
firm performance. This paper criticizes this part of the literature by arguing that it is in 
a pre-theoretical stage since no unambiguous explanation of the relationship between 
the variables deemed to be relevant is offered. 
In view of the lack of conclusiveness of the debates in the literature, this paper 
argues that one viable solution to the empirical stalemate would be to develop criteria 
to determine whether firms are entrepreneurial or managerial and then apply the 
appropriate theories to samples of firms drawn using such benchmarks. Alternatively,  
this article suggest that researchers could adopt a firm lifecycle theoretical perspective 
that includes relevant aspects of both entrepreneurial and managerial firms and that 
therefore is applicable to a sample containing both kinds of firms. 
 To show that the debate has been inconclusive and to perform a critical review of 
the literature, this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the debate on 
whether ownership structure affects firm performance. Section 3 addresses the debate 
on the relationship between the composition of the board of directors and firm 
performance. Section 4 reviews the recent literature on managerial entrenchment 
through the deployment of anti-takeover provisions and its effects on firm 
performance. Section 5 discusses empirical work that uses comprehensive lists of 
governance variables. Section 6 concludes by summarizing the drawbacks in the 
literature and by suggesting how they may be avoided. 
2. Ownership structure and firm performance 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been the 
theme of a major debate in the corporate governance literature. The purpose of this 
section is to review this debate. After examining the seminal articles by Demsetz and 
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Lehn (1985) and Morck et al. (1988), the contributions of latter researchers that have 
examined this issue are reviewed. Despite much work on the subject the debate 
remains inconclusive. 
 
2.1. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
Based on theoretical work by Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) take 
issue with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) partial result that the market value of the 
firm falls as the percentage ownership of the entrepreneur decreases. At the same 
time, however, Demsetz and Lehn surpass the ultimate message of Jensen and 
Meckling’s model, namely, that the owner-manager will minimize agency costs 
because he bears such costs, so that firms maximize “profits, or more accurately, 
present value” even though the entrepreneur is no longer the sole owner of the firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 307). According to Demsetz: 
 
The structure of ownership … is an endogenous outcome of competitive selection in 
which various advantages and disadvantages are balanced to arrive at an equilibrium 
organization of the firm.  
(Demsetz, 1983, p. 384) 
 
According to this view, the ownership structures that we observe in the real world 
will be a function of the characteristics of each particular firm, and that this ownership 
structure will be chosen through competitive selection processes in such a way that 
only those structures that maximize profit (or present value) will exist in practice. 
Consequently, according to Demsetz there is no reason to expect a positive correlation 
between ownership concentration and profit rates.  
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To investigate the issue empirically Demsetz and Lehn (1985) perform a two stage 
least squares regression in which, in the key equation, a measure of accounting profit 
rates (accounting profit after taxes as a percentage of the book value of equity) is 
regressed on various measures of ownership concentration and control variables. 
Demsetz and Lehn find an insignificant negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and accounting profit rate, and conclude that the results support their 
hypothesis. 
As we will see below, this result has been challenged on the grounds that Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) utilize an inappropriate econometric specification. However, perhaps 
it is more important to emphasize that the real weakness of their argument resides in 
that there are important facts missing in their theory which, if incorporated to the 
model, would change its predictions.  
Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) theory ignores that managements typically have at 
their disposal a remarkable variety of instruments with which to obstruct market 
mechanisms that may exert pressure towards a particular ownership structure. Thus, 
for example, a hostile takeover attempt might be viewed under Demsetz and Lehn’s 
perspective as an aspect of competitive selection processes that bring about a more 
concentrated ownership structure which is optimal for a firm which faces a particular 
situation. In their view, the outcome of the hostile takeover would be to concentrate 
ownership and thereby mitigate agency costs and ensure profit maximization. 
However, if the management in question persuades the board of directors of the firm 
to deploy anti-takeover provisions such as poison pills, staggered boards, 
supermajority vote requirements, etc. it is not apparent at all that market forces will 
prevail. In fact the prospective ‘corporate raider’ may be dissuaded from attempting 
the hostile takeover in the first place. Therefore, it is by no means certain that the 
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ownership structures that are observed in practice solely reflect the outcome of 
competitive selection processes that act towards the minimization of agency costs and 
the maximization of profits. 
 
2.2. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
In sharp contrast to the foregoing arguments, Morck et al. (1988) emphasize the 
partial result in Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) model that the market value of the firm 
falls as the percentage ownership of the entrepreneur decreases, and moreover tend to 
depart from the chief message of the theory which states that offsetting mechanisms 
minimize agency costs.  
In particular, in order to “describe patterns in the data” (p. 298) Morck et al. (1988) 
super-impose an entrenchment hypothesis to Jensen and Meckling’s incentive 
alignment hypothesis. The authors suggest that a manager who possesses a high 
ownership stake in his firm is effectively entrenched, and can therefore increase 
perquisite consumption and other agency costs at the expense of shareholders without 
fear of removal “although perhaps to a more limited extent than if he had effective 
control but no claim on the firm’s cash flows” (Morck et al., 1988, p. 294).  
Thus, according to Morck et al. (1988) one can expect a non-linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance shaped by the two main 
forces affecting the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance: 
(i) Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) “convergence of interests hypothesis” which 
predicts a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm valuation that 
is expected to work at all levels of ownership concentration and (ii) their 
“entrenchment hypothesis” which predicts negative relationship between managerial 
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ownership and firm valuation that is expected to work “for some range of high 
ownership stakes” (Morck et al., 1988, p. 294). 
In their empirical analysis Morck et al. (1988), use a sample of large publicly held 
corporations and experiment with various piece wise linear regressions. They find a 
positive relation between ownership concentration and Tobin’s q in the 0% to 5% 
ownership range, a negative and less pronounced relation in the 5% to 25% range, and 
a further positive relation above 25%.  
Morck et al. (1988) suggest an interpretation of these results that is consistent with 
both the convergence-of-interests and entrenchment effects. According to the authors, 
the initial rise in Tobin’s q (from 0% to 5%) might reflect manager’s greater 
incentives to maximize value as their stakes rise. Then in the 5% to 25% interval 
entrenchment might explain the declining valuation of corporate assets as indicated by 
their entrenchment hypothesis. Finally, at around 25% ownership, the researchers 
argue that both the management and the board may be effectively entrenched and thus 
the increase in Tobin’s q for the interval from 25%-100% range may reflect a pure 
convergence-of-interests effect.   
Moreover, in order to compare their results to those in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Morck et al. (1988) also investigate the relationship between board ownership and 
firm performance as measured by the profit rate. When this latter measure of firm 
performance is utilized the “qualitative pattern” of estimated coefficients is found to 
be similar to the Tobin’s q regressions, but the statistical significance of the estimates 
is much lower, and only the positive slope in the 0% to 5% range is significant at the 
5% level (Morck et al. 1988, p. 306). Thus, Morck et al. (1988) conclude that “the 
failure in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) to find a relationship between ownership 
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concentration and profitability is probably due to their use of a linear specification 
that does not capture an important non-monotonicity” (Morck et al. 1988, p. 307). 
The weakness of Morck et al.’s work clearly resides in that there are missing parts 
in their theory. A management team that owns little or no equity can be just as 
entrenched as an entrepreneur who owns substantial equity. Corporate managements 
have the capability of deploying anti-takeover provisions. Now, an entrepreneur with 
substantial ownership would have to pay out of its own wealth for a higher fraction of 
agency costs incurred, and on this account he may wish to reduce them. On the other 
hand, a management team that owns little or no equity would not have such an 
incentive to minimize agency costs and, if entrenched using anti-takeover provisions 
it would have an opportunity to incur them without fear of a possible takeover. Hence 
recognition of these facts would change the predictions of Morck et al.’s model. 
 
2.3. Further contributions to the debate 
In addition to the critique of Morck et al.’s (1988) arguments mentioned above it 
should be added the objection that their work mainly attempts to explain an observed 
pattern that they find in their data and therefore may be particular to their sample. In 
this vein, it is possible that their findings may be due to statistical accident rather than 
economic phenomenon. 
For example, McConnell and Servaes (1990) using larger samples fail to replicate 
Morck et al.’s (1988) findings. Instead they find a different pattern: using ordinary 
least squares McConnell and Servaes find a significant curvilinear relation between 
Tobin’s q and the fraction of common stock owned by corporate insiders. For samples 
corresponding to the years 1976 and 1986 their estimated curves slope upward until 
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insider ownership reaches approximately 40% to 50% and then slope slightly 
downward. 
In addition, although using a different measure of ownership (i.e. holdings by the 
current CEO and former CEOs still present in the board), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) find yet another pattern: firstly, at levels of ownership lower than 1% Tobin’s 
q increases with ownership. Then, the authors find a decreasing relation at levels of 
ownership between 1% and 5%, and an increasing relation between 5% and 20%. 
Finally, at levels greater than 20%, they find that Tobin’s q decreases with ownership. 
This work is also interesting in that it employs panel data and instrumental variable 
methods in order to check that their results are not driven by a particular type of 
endogeneity of managerial shareholdings.2 
From the findings in these additional papers it seems likely that the patterns that 
will be found in the data will depend on the sample employed. McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) find a curvilinear relationship, while Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
divide ownership concentration in four segments in their piecewise linear 
specifications rather than the three segments in Morck et al. (1988). Nevertheless, 
despite the differences found, both papers conclude that their results are consistent 
with the arguments in Morck et al. (1988).  
An instructive exchange in this literature occurred between Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) and Zhou (2001). In their paper, Himmelberg et al. adopt the perspective put 
forward by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and, in addition, argue that 
fixed effect estimators should be employed in order to examine the relation between 
                                                 
2 The type of endogeneity that Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) examine is not the one suggested by 
Demsetz (1983) i.e. ownership being the outcome of a competitive process. Rather, Hermalin and 
Weisbach suggest that managerial shareholdings may be related to performance “for two reasons: first, 
managers will exercise their stock options after their stock goes up, but not after it goes down; second, 
managers with information about good future prospects are more likely to buy more stock, while 
managers with bad information about their own stock are likely to sell” (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, 
p. 102).  
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ownership structure and firm performance. Consistent with the Demsetz (1983) view, 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) find no significant correlation between managerial 
ownership and firm performance.  
Prompted by the work of Himmelberg et al. (1999), Zhou (2001) demonstrates that 
while managerial ownership varies significantly across firms it varies very little from 
year to year within firms. Clearly, this invalidates the appropriateness of using fixed 
effect approach: since there is only small number of changes over time in the 
ownership variables, the inclusion of firm fixed effects would force estimation of the 
coefficients from just these few changes. Hence, Zhou (2001) concludes that 
Himmelberg et al.’s findings do not offer strong evidence against the view that 
ownership structure affects firm performance. 
Still, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that previous work up to that date had 
failed to take into account an important aspect of ownership structure: “that the 
fractions of shares owned by outside shareholders and by management should be 
measured separately” (p. 211) and also that previous work had been flawed in that it 
failed to take into account the endogeneity of ownership structure hypothesised by 
Demsetz (1983). Using two stage least squares and a subsample of the original 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) sample, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance (this time measured 
using Tobin’s q). The weakness in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), as that in Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985), remains that there is a failure to recognize that managements 
generally possess the means with which to obstruct market selection mechanisms that 
may bring about a particular ownership structure. The obvious example is that 
managements have learned to deploy anti-takeover provisions. 
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In contrast, in an important contribution Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) employ a new 
measure of firm performance: the ratio of yearly return on investment to cost of 
capital (marginal q). By utilizing the marginal q technique developed by Mueller and 
Reardon (1993) and panel data analysis, the researchers find a significant 
positive/negative/ positive pattern. The results show that the ratio of yearly return on 
investment to cost of capital (marginal q) is less than one (0.935) when insider 
ownership is zero. Then the data shows a positive relation between insider ownership 
and marginal q until insider ownership reaches 21.5% and a marginal q = 1.069, a 
negative relation between 21.5% and 63% where marginal q is again less than one 
(0.945), and from then on a positive relation, when insider ownership equals 100% the 
estimated marginal q is 1.417. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that Gugler and 
Yurtoglu’s work is still subject to the same objections to the original Morck et al. 
(1988) paper: there are important parts missing in the theory, and their findings may 
be due to statistical accident rather than an economic phenomenon. 
Finally, Coles et al. (2012) construct a single period structural model of the firm 
that follows the general idea of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that managerial ownership 
and firm performance are jointly determined in equilibrium. In particular, their model 
proposes that there is no causal relationship between ownership and Tobin’s q and 
that rather they are both jointly determined by the productivity of firm assets in place 
and managerial input. The authors then estimate the inverse U-shaped relationship 
between Tobin’s q and ownership often found in previous studies and find a 
maximum Tobin´s q at ownership levels close to 20%. However, they argue that this 
observed pattern is the result of omitting the productivity parameters proposed in their 
model which leads to a spurious correlation between management ownership and firm 
performance. Moreover, it is argued that the inverse U-shaped pattern represents a 
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value maximization relation between ownership and Tobin’s q. Now, one clear 
limitation of this model is that it only considers one period and therefore it is not 
possible to consider agency problems that are likely to persist overtime such as the 
agency costs of free cash flows. Moreover, the model ignores the role of the market 
for corporate control and the impact that antitakeover provisions may have in the 
model’s contractual setting. 
 
2.4. Critical evaluation of the ownership structure-firm performance debate 
As this section has shown, the debate regarding whether ownership structure 
affects firm performance remains inconclusive. While one group of researchers argues 
that there is a relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, there is 
an opposite group that denies this relationship. Moreover, both camps find 
corroborating evidence in favour of their respective positions. How can this situation 
be accounted for? 
Clearly, the following observation by Fama (1980) that the firms in the literature 
following Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) are strictly 
entrepreneurial, and as a result fail to explain the large modern corporation in which 
management owns little or no equity, is highly relevant: 
 
The striking insight of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
is in viewing the firm as a set of contracts among factors of production… This 
insight, however, is not carried far enough. In the classical theory, the agent who 
personifies the firm is the entrepreneur who is taken to be both manager and residual 
risk bearer. Although his title sometimes changes –for example, Alchian and Demsetz 
call him "the employer"– the entrepreneur continues to play a central role in the firm 
of the property-rights literature. As a consequence, this literature fails to explain the 
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large modern corporation in which control of the firm is in the hands of managers 
who are more or less separate from the firm's security holders. 
(Fama, 1980, p. 289, emphasis added) 
Importantly, Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 356) admit this much when they state: 
“One of the most serious limitation of the analysis is that as it stands we have not 
worked out in this paper its application to the very large modern corporation whose 
managers own little or no equity.” 
 Thus, by applying models designed to explain entrepreneurial firms without first 
making sure that their datasets contain nothing but entrepreneurial firms, researchers 
in this empirical literature are likely misapplying the theory. In this case, an 
appropriate assessment of the theory calls for the construction of a database from a 
sample of entrepreneurial firms, followed by the usual hypothesis testing procedures. 
Until this analysis is carried out properly it is impossible to know if the theory is 
supported or rejected by the evidence.  
Consequently, the main criticism raised in this paper concerning the ownership-
structure firm performance debate is that there has been a misapplication of 
entrepreneurial AT (a theory designed to explain the performance entrepreneurial 
firms) in the literature since the papers summarized above clearly included a 
substantial number of managerial firms in the samples employed. This is evidenced 
by the fact that that firms in which managerial ownership is close to zero percent are 
included the empirical analyses. Moreover, this suggests that the mixed results are the 
consequence of testing entrepreneurial AT using samples containing a class of firms 
the theory was not designed to explain. 
Finally, it is important to note that Fama’s (1980) contention that the theories by 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) do not apply to the 
large modern corporation also explains some of the missing parts in the models 
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examined above. For instance, agency costs of free cash flows and a large number of 
anti-takeover provisions are not features one would expect to find in a young 
entrepreneurial firm whose owner-manager is seeking to sell securities to outside 
investors. Instead, these are characteristics which one would likely associate with a 
mature managerial firm. 
 
 
3. The composition of the board of directors and firm performance 
In order to fill this gap in AT, a subsequent paper by Fama and Jensen (1983) 
extended AT by building a special model for the case of firms in which ownership is 
separate from control. According to Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 315) outside directors 
often hold a majority of seats and “have incentives to carry out their tasks and do not 
collude with managers to expropriate residual claimants.” In particular, their argument 
is the following: 
 
Our hypothesis is that outside directors have incentives to develop reputations as 
experts in decision control. Most outside directors of open corporations are either 
managers of other corporations or important decision agents in other complex 
organizations. The value of their human capital depends primarily on their 
performance as internal decision managers in other organizations. They use their 
directorships to signal to internal and external markets for decision agents that (1) 
they are decision experts, (2) they understand the importance of diffuse and separate 
decision control, and (3) they can work with such decision control systems. The 
signals are credible when the direct payments to outside directors are small, but there 
is substantial devaluation of human capital when internal decision control breaks 
down…  
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(Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 
315) 
 
Thus, parallel to the literature on ownership structure and firm performance in the 
previous section, a related literature has developed in which the central issue in the 
debate is to determine whether the proportion of outside directors in the board is 
associated to firm performance. The key point is to determine if outside directors in 
the board effectively minimize agency costs as suggested by the managerial model in 
Fama and Jensen (1983). 
 
3.1. The debate concerning board structure and firm performance 
The debate on whether the composition of the board of directors (i.e. the 
proportion of outside directors on the board) affects firm performance can be 
described as one between two opposing camps, with a group of researchers who argue 
that there is a causal relationship that goes from board composition to firm 
performance and an opposing group denying this association.  
One of the earliest papers in this literature is by Baysinger and Butler (1985). 
Clearly motivated by the theoretical discussion in Fama and Jensen (1983) and other 
contemporaneous work on the functions of the board of directors, they investigate 
whether differences in board independence (measured as the proportion of outside 
independent directors), and/or changes in board independence, cause financial 
performance differences across corporations. Baysinger and Butler (1985) find that 
boards with a higher proportion of independent directors in 1970 enjoyed relatively 
better records of financial performance in 1980 as measured by Relative Financial 
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Performance (RFP).3 However, their empirical analysis suggests that there is no 
significant contemporaneous relationship between board composition and financial 
performance. Thus they conclude that board composition has an impact on firm 
performance, but that the effect is lagged. 
Baysinger and Butler’s (1985) results have been challenged on several accounts. 
First, the objection has been raised that the lag of 10 years used by the researchers 
seems excessive in order to detect a positive influence of board composition on firm 
performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Secondly, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) argue that Baysinger and Butler’s results are biased because their work ignores 
an alleged “endogeneity of board structure.” According to these researchers, since 
there is strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis that “poor performance leads to 
changes in board composition, … any cross-sectional regression of performance on 
board composition will be biased because of changes in board composition resulting 
merely from past performance” (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, p. 102).  
Another important paper in the debate, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), attempts a 
more direct approach in order to investigate the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance. Rather than examining inter-correlations or 
employing regression analysis, they rely on standard event time methods in order to 
examine the effect of the appointment of an outside director by management (as 
opposed to a selection by a large shareholder or as a result of a proxy contest) on 
stock returns. They find that clearly identifiable announcements of the appointment of 
an outside director selected by management are significantly associated with positive 
abnormal stock returns, thus finding a significant statistical link between board 
composition and firm performance.  
                                                 
3 Relative Financial Performance (RFP) is calculated by dividing a firm’s return on equity (ROE) by 
the average ROE of all the firms in its primary industry, including those not in the sample. 
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Nevertheless this result has also been subject to important criticism. For example, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that the increase in value that Rosenstein and 
Wyatt observe could simply reflect the fact that, concurrent to the addition of the new 
outside director, the company is changing its board structure with a view to improve 
its efficiency, and thus the increase in shareholder wealth would reflect the changes 
taking place in the company rather than anything having to do with the new appointed 
outside director. 
On the other hand, evidence in favour of the hypothesis that board composition 
does not affect firm performance is provided by Fosberg (1989). Using paired sample 
methods Fosberg finds no correlation between board composition and firm 
performance. Hence he concludes that there is no causal relationship between the two 
variables. 
Additional evidence against the argument that board composition affects firm 
performance is provided by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black 
(2002). Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) based on their own previous research, and 
Bhagat and Black (2002) who confirm previous empirical findings, point out that the 
evidence strongly suggests that firms add outside directors following poor firm 
performance. Accordingly, these researchers argue that the composition of the board 
of directors is endogenously determined, and that in order to take account of this 
endogeneity, it is essential to employ simultaneous equation models and/or 
instrumental variable techniques to study the relevant empirical relationships.  
Thus, using these methods they find no correlation between board composition and 
firm performance as measured by Tobin’s q and accounting measures (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991), and no evidence that the strategy of increasing the number of 
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outside ‘independent’ directors improves firm performance for the three years 
following the changes (Bhagat and Black, 2002). 
Finally, a recent paper by Duchin et al. (2010) takes advantage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act regulations adopted in 2002 (as well as NYSE and Nasdaq regulations 
adopted in 2003), which required some U.S. companies to increase the number of 
outside directors on their boards, to investigate the effect of board composition on 
firm performance in a setting that is largely free from endogeneity concerns. The 
authors argue that their key result is that the effect these “exogenous” changes in the 
proportion of outside directors depended on the cost of acquiring information about 
the companies. In particular, when information costs were low, an increase in the 
proportion of outside directors improved firm performance as measured by ROA, 
Tobin’s q and stock returns. However, when information costs were high, an increase 
in the proportion of outside directors hurt firm performance similarly measured. One 
important difficulty with this approach, however, is that the authors cannot exclude 
the possibility that outsiders added to the board to comply with regulations may be 
different from outsiders added in the normal course of business. Thus, it is not certain 
that a non-compulsory increase in the proportion of outsiders will have the same 
effect as that documented in the paper. 
 
3.2. Board size and firm performance 
In addition to the debate regarding board composition and firm performance, some 
empirical research has also been undertaken in this literature to determine the 
relationship between board size and firm performance. The starting point of this 
research is the work by Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), who argue that 
small boards are better monitors of management than large ones for the reason that 
 20
large boards are likely to suffer from coordination problems. Moreover, it has been 
contended that agency problems inside the board (such as director free-riding 
problems) could be greater for larger boards when compared to those in smaller ones 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The upshot is that the performance of large boards 
should be less efficient when compared to that of smaller boards. 
Yermack (1996) evaluates these theories by investigating the relationship between 
board size and firm performance. The author explicates that his hypothesis is that firm 
value as measured by Tobin’s q is a function of the quality of monitoring and 
decision-making by the board. Under the assumption that board size is a good 
determinant of board performance, Yermack argues that there should be negative 
relationship between firm performance and board size. Therefore, companies with 
smaller boards of directors should have higher market values. Consistent with his 
hypothesis, Yermack (1996) finds an inverse relation between firm market value (as 
measured by Tobin’s q) and the size of the board of directors. Moreover, he also finds 
that firm profitability, as measured by return on assets and return on sales, also exhibit 
an inverse relationship with board size. 
In contrast, however, Bhagat and Black (2002) find no consistent correlation 
between board size and various measures of firm performance including Tobin’s q, 
and accounting measures such as return on assets (ROA). Bhagat and Black (2002) 
suggest that their results may be different from those in Yermack (1996) because 
“board size is known to be endogenously related to many other factors that may 
correlate with performance, including industry, inside share ownership, firm size, and 
board independence” (p. 260).  They conclude that their results cast “doubt on the 
robustness of any correlation between board size and firm performance” (Bhagat and 
Black, 2002, p. 260).  
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3.3 Critical evaluation of the debate on board characteristics and firm performance  
The main critique that this paper puts forward concerning the debate on board 
characteristics and firm performance is similar to that in the previous section. 
Specifically, this paper contends that by applying a model created especially to 
explain firms in which ownership is separate from control (Fama and Jensen, 1983) 
and not checking that their databases consist only of managerial firms featuring such 
separation, researchers are likely to be misapplying managerial AT. A correct 
application of the theory requires that researchers, using some explicit criteria as to 
what constitutes separation of ownership from control, take steps to insure that their 
samples contain managerial firms only, and only then attempt to test the theory.  
In addition, it is worth noting that by concentrating on Fama and Jensen’s (1983) 
theory researchers in this field tend to ignore completely the alternative managerial 
AT theory concerning the agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). For 
instance, one of the most interesting points in the discussion concerns Hermalin and 
Weisbach’s (1991) and Bhagat and Black’s (2002) finding that firms add outside 
directors following poor firm performance. In this connection, an interesting issue 
(overlooked in the literature) would be to check if these firms also suffer from agency 
costs of free cash flows. It could be the case that the existence of abundant free cash 
flows which are expected to continue for an extended period of time are the cause of 
both a deteriorating board structure (since in order to mal-invest the free cash flows 
the managers would need to weaken board supervision) and a declining Tobin`s q (as 
managements should be increasingly able to use the free cash flows to invest in 
negative net present value projects as board quality deteriorates).  
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Finally, in considering this debate is important to keep in mind that the main 
disagreement among researchers in this area of the corporate governance literature is 
not whether the worst or best performing firms are those with larger boards, or those 
with boards that exhibit a higher proportion of outside directors. Rather, the dispute 
centres on whether there is a causal link between the larger boards, or the higher 
proportion of outsiders on the board, and better or worse performance. 
 
4. Anti-takeover provisions and firm performance 
This section reviews empirical work in literature on corporate governance and firm 
performance which is characterized by the use of indices of anti-takeover provisions. 
The essential point in the works reviewed in this section concerns the possibility that 
entrenched managers could act opportunistically without having to worry about the 
threat of takeover. Note that there exists an earlier literature that investigates the 
relationship between individual corporate governance provisions, i.e. each provision 
in isolation, and firm performance. However, since Danielson and Karpoff (1998) 
have shown that firms utilize governance provisions in groups in order to build their 
anti-takeover defences and not in isolation, this section concentrates in articles that 
utilize indices of anti-takeover provisions.4  
 
4.1. The relationship between anti-takeover provisions and firm performance 
The origins of this literature can be traced back to the seminal work by Gompers et 
al. (2003). Rather than studying ownership structure or board composition Gompers et 
al. (2003) combine a large set of corporate governance provisions into an index and 
then utilize this index to investigate empirically if there exists a significant 
                                                 
4 The older literature on the relationship between individual corporate governance provisions and firm 
performance will not be reviewed but a survey is available in Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
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relationship between corporate governance as measured by the index and firm 
performance. Using information gathered from the Investors Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) on 24 corporate governance provisions, Gompers et al. (2003) create 
their index by adding one point for each provision which in their view increases 
managerial power vis-à-vis their shareholders. Hence, Gompers et al. argue that one 
interpretation of the results in their paper is that the balance of power between 
shareholders and managers may have an impact on firm performance. For this reason, 
they call their index the “governance index” or “G-index”.  
Significantly, Gompers et al. (2003) argue that the theories currently available in 
the literature do not provide them with unambiguous predictions as to how the key 
variables which they employ in their study may be related to each other. Thus, they 
state that their work asks an empirical question. One difficulty with this approach is 
promptly revealed in their paper as they find not one, but three possible interpretations 
as to the meaning of the empirical relationships which they find. Moreover, a different 
problem of interpretation with Gompers et al. approach is reflected in the fact that 
latter writers in this literature, specially Cremers and Nair (2005) and Brown and 
Caylor (2004; 2006a; 2006b), have argued that in view of the large number of anti-
takeover provisions in the G-index, the index is in fact a measure of anti-takeover 
protection and not a broad measure of shareholder rights as originally maintained by 
Gompers et al. (2003). 
As a result of carrying out Fama-Macbeth regressions (Fama and MacBeth, 1973; 
Cochrane, 2005, pp. 245-251), Gompers et al. (2003) find a negative and significant 
relationship between their G-index and firm valuation as measured by industry 
adjusted Tobin’s q during the 1990-1999 time period. Moreover, Gompers et al. find a 
negative and significant relationship between the G-index and firm performance as 
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measured by industry adjusted net profit margin and sales growth. On the other hand, 
they fail to find a significant relationship between the G-index and industry adjusted 
‘return on equity’ (ROE) during the same period. On the whole, these results suggest 
that firms with low G-index (interpreted as good corporate governance) and good firm 
performance are positively related.5  
 
4.2 Subsequent developments 
In contrast to the intense debates discussed in the previous sections regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, the results in the 
work undertaken in this literature has been more or less consistent in the sense that 
although some of the results do not match those in Gompers et al. (2003), most papers 
find a significant correlation between governance indices, such as the G-index, and at 
least one measure of firm performance, such as Tobin’s q and the different accounting 
ratios.  
Another difference with the previous debates is that an important part of the 
discussion in this literature has centred on the question concerning whether the 
governance and performance measurements employed by Gompers et al. (2003) are 
the most appropriate for the work at hand. For example, Core et al. (2006) suggest 
that the reason why Gompers et al. (2003) failed to find a relationship between G-
index and industry adjusted return on equity is that ROE is not a very good measure 
of performance because it is affected by discretionary items such as leverage and 
extraordinary items. For this reason, Core et al. utilize industry adjusted return on 
                                                 
5 Gompers et al. (2003) also report a trading strategy that yielded risk-adjusted abnormal returns based 
on the information in the G-index during the 1990s. In so far as this result is part of the “market 
anomalies” literature, and not part of the corporate governance and firm performance literature proper, 
we do not examine this result in this paper. For an interesting discussion on this topic see Bebchuk et 
al. (2013) who document the disappearance of this anomaly at the turn of the century, and argue that 
the correlation vanished as market participants learned to appreciate the difference between good and 
poor governance.  
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assets (ROA) in place of return on equity and find significant evidence that a high G-
index is associated with lower operating performance as measured by industry 
adjusted ROA. 
On the other hand, work has also been carried out in order to determine the relative 
importance of the anti-takeover provisions in Gompers et al.’s (2003) G-index. For 
example, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) investigate the association between staggered 
boards and firm value during the period 1995-2002. They find that, after controlling 
for the other governance provisions in the G-index and various firm characteristics, 
staggered boards are negatively associated with firm value as measured by industry 
adjusted Tobin’s q and that this effect is substantially larger than the average effect of 
the other provisions.  
However, the most important effort to refine the G-index to date has been 
undertaken by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Bebchuk et al. question the wisdom of using 
indexes with a large number of provisions due to problems such as the possibility of 
introducing noise by means of adding innocuous or even beneficial provisions in the 
index. The danger is that if such innocuous or beneficial provisions are introduced in 
the index the provisions that really matter would be underweighted. 
Therefore, in order to identify the most important governance provisions Bebchuk 
et al. (2009) form a list of provisions based on discussions with lawyers, their own 
personal analysis, and the examination of provisions which attract opposition from 
institutional investors. This reasoned method allows the researchers to identify a 
group of six key governance provisions which in their view play a substantial role in 
the correlation between the G-index and shareholder value, namely: staggered boards, 
limits to amend by-laws, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements 
for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments. Finally, with 
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these key governance provisions Bebchuk et al. (2009) create an “entrenchment 
index” which they label “E-index” by assigning each company a point for each of the 
provisions in the index that the firm has.  
Using similar econometric techniques to those in Gompers et al. (2003), Bebchuk 
et al. (2009) find that controlling for the rest of the IRRC provisions, the provisions 
constituting the E-index –both individually and in the aggregate– are significantly and 
negatively correlated with firm value as measured by Tobin’s q. In view of these 
results, the researchers argue that the E-index substantially drives the correlation 
between the G-index and firm valuation.  
In contrast, however, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) arguing that there may be 
endogeneity in the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance 
and a host of other variables employ a system of simultaneous equations and find 
results that, they argue, contrast with previous work. While Gompers et al. (2003) and 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) find a significant correlation between their respective indices 
and contemporary Tobin’s q, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find no such correlation 
between both indices (i.e. the G-index and the E-index) and firm performance 
measured as next year’s Tobin’s q. On the other hand, however, Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) do find a significant correlation between both governance indices and next 
year’s ROA. 
Finally, Bebchuk et al. (2013) corroborate the persistence of the negative 
relationship of between antitakeover indices (both the G-index and the E-index) and 
Tobin´s q and firm operating performance measures over a longer time horizon than 
previous studies. While the earlier papers used samples mainly drawn from the 1990s, 
Bebchuk et al. (2013) document that the relationship between antitakeover indices and 
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firm performance remained strongly negative both during 1990-2001and in the 2002-
2008 time period. 
 
4.3 Critical review of the approach 
Since most of the papers in this literature find at least some significant relationship 
between the different governance indices and at least one of the measures of firm 
performance, the weaknesses in this work seem to be mainly interpretative, which 
indicates a lack of theoretical depth in the literature. For example, researchers in this 
literature have not given completely satisfactory answers to questions such as the 
following: do a large number of anti-takeover provisions bring about lower firm value 
or, conversely, do the management of firms with low valuation deploy larger numbers 
of anti-takeover provisions? 
Thus, for instance, Gompers et al. (2003), Bebchuk et al. (2009) and Bebchuk et al. 
(2013) are not able to establish the direction of causality driving the relationship 
between anti-takeover provisions and firm valuation; rather they leave the question 
open as “a challenge for future research” (Gompers, 2003, p. 145). In this connection, 
Lehn et al. (2007) have presented results consistent with the hypothesis that the 
managements of firms with historically low valuations have deployed larger numbers 
of anti-takeover provisions (since the mid-1980s) rather than the other way around. 
Unfortunately however, their “test cannot rule out the possibility that a third variable 
affects both valuation multiples and governance indices; thereby creating a spurious 
relation between the two variables” (Lehn et al., 2007, p. 908, footnote 1).   
Given the lack of a fully developed theory that takes into account aspects of the 
lifecycle of the firm (i.e. the differences between entrepreneurial and managerial 
firms) and historical aspects regarding the evolution of institutions in the relevant 
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stock markets (i.e. the tightening of the takeover constraint during the takeover wave 
of the 1980s), it is understandable that such questions are difficult to answer. It is 
apparent that a satisfactory answer to this question requires a fully developed theory 
of corporate governance and firm performance that takes into account both, the ways 
in which firms change as they go through their lifecycles, as well as the effects of 
institutional constraints on potential managerial opportunism.  
 
5. Empirical work that uses comprehensive lists of corporate governance 
variables 
This section reviews work in the field of corporate governance and firm 
performance that employs comprehensive lists of corporate governance variables. The 
aim of this section is to clarify that work along these lines has not yet addressed the 
problems mentioned earlier in the paper, specifically those regarding the incorrectness 
of applying the different versions of AT to databases constructed from samples 
containing both entrepreneurial and managerial corporations.  
Given that some papers in the governance literature include measurements of 
ownership structure, board composition, and governance provisions in a single 
empirical analysis, it may seem that the problem mentioned earlier in this paper to the 
effect that managerial models should be applied only to managerial firms, and that 
entrepreneurial models should be applied only to entrepreneurial firms, has already 
been dealt with in the literature. In considering these papers it may be argued that new 
theories have already been built in order to deal with both types of firms. This section 
argues that this is not the case and examines this issue with reference to the work of 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), who are the pioneers in this area of research. 
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5.1. Rationale behind work that uses long lists of corporate governance mechanisms 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) start their paper by stating that they base their study 
in two arguments: 
 
First, since alternative control mechanisms exist, greater use of one mechanism need 
not be positively related to firm performance. Where one mechanism is used less, 
others may be used more, resulting in equally good performance. 
Second, the extent to which several of the control mechanisms are used is decided 
within the firm… [Hence] we expect these choices will be made to maximize firm 
value. Use of a mechanism will be increased until marginal costs and marginal 
benefits to the firm are just equal. 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p. 379) 
 
Further, they separate their governance variables into “internal” and “external” 
mechanisms as follows: “[i]nside shareholding, outside representation of the board, 
reliance on debt financing, and reliance on external labor markets are all internal 
decisions. Institutional shareholdings, outside block holdings, and activity in the 
market for corporate control are decisions made by outsiders” (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996, p. 381). Finally, Agrawal and Knoeber state their key hypothesis:  
 
If the four internal mechanisms are selected optimally, a carefully specified cross-
sectional regression should find no relation between firm performance and the use of 
these mechanisms. 
 (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, pp. 381) 
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However, after estimating a carefully designed system of simultaneous equations 
to test their hypothesis, Agrawal and Knoeber find substantial evidence against it: 
they find a negative and statistically significant relationship between outside 
representation in the board of directors and firm performance as measured by using 
Tobin’s q (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, pp. 379, 393). Similarly, subsequent work 
carried out along the lines proposed by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), such as that in 
Beiner et al. (2006) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008), has also found statistically 
significant relationships between some of the internal governance variables in their 
lists and different measures of firm performance. 
 
5.2. A theory is more than a list of variables 
Now, a theory is not necessarily rejected in practice for failing to predict 
accurately as long as there is no better alternative (Jensen, 1983; Kuhn, 1970; Conant, 
1947). The problem in this case, however, is that a theory is more than a list of 
variables. 
More specifically, the trouble with Agrawal and Knoeber’s (1996) scheme is that 
while the substitution effects in the argument above implies that there should be a 
negative relationship between the governance mechanisms and no relationship 
between governance mechanisms and firm performance, in fact the authors stop short 
of stating specific relationships between their variables: 
 
Since all of the control mechanisms are alternative ways to provide incentives to 
managers, each might plausibly be used instead of another. If so, we would expect 
use of the mechanisms to be negatively related. But this is not the only possibility. 
Positive relations may also exist… [Several examples follow, and then the authors 
conclude:] … similar ambiguity exists for the relations between many of the other 
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control mechanisms. Given this ambiguity we cannot test for particular relations but 
we do explore these relations empirically… 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, pp. 380-381) 
 
Now, according to theory building experts the specification of relationships 
between the variables is one of the indispensable elements that a fully developed 
theory must have.6 In particular, theories are made of variables, but a list of variables 
is not a theory. If the relationships between the variables are not clearly and definitely 
stated, then we only have a list of variables, not a theory (Dubin, 1978; Whetten, 
1989). Other researchers working in this area, such as Beiner et al. (2006) and Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008), have also failed to specify firm theoretical relationships between 
the variables in their studies. Thus, work in this area may be described as an empirical 
exploration of data which is considered to be relevant without a fully developed 
theory capable of explaining both entrepreneurial and managerial firms.  
In addition, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) seem not to take into account Fama’s 
(1980) criticism that early theory in AT, such as that in Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
does not explain the large modern corporation. Conversely, they seem to overlook that 
subsequent theory in AT, such as that in Fama and Jensen (1983), was built with the 
purpose of explaining firms where ownership is separated from control. The potential 
problem is that variables which are highly relevant in some of the early versions of 
AT, but not in the posterior versions of AT, may not be relevant for use in a combined 
model.  
                                                 
6 Whetten (1989) argues that there are four key elements that all fully developed scientific theories 
must have, which he summarizes using the following four words: what, how, why and where. The 
“what” refers to the variables that the theorist regards as relevant to explain the phenomena at hand, the 
“how” refers to the relationships between the variables contained in the theory, the “why” refers to the 
reasons why the variables should be related in the way indicated by the theory (in the social sciences 
this usually involves the adoption of behavioural assumptions) and the “where” refers to the specific 
class of phenomena the theory is designed to explain i.e. in which cases the theory is supposed to hold. 
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6. Conclusion 
AT originally started from the perspective that agency costs are merely a 
production cost like any other, that these are therefore minimized by an entrepreneur 
owner-manager because he has strong incentives to do so, and that consequently, 
firms would tend to maximize profits (or more precisely the present value of the 
firm). However, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and later firmly 
emphasized by Fama (1980), the original entrepreneurial AT formulation does not 
apply to the large modern corporation characterized by diffused ownership and 
professional management. To close this gap, additional work was undertaken by Fama 
and Jensen (1983) to further show, how agency costs would be minimized in 
managerial firms. The key mechanism in the newer model was the board of directors, 
which was assumed to be capable of minimizing agency costs in the context of the 
large managerial corporation. According to this model the firm would also maximize 
profits (present value). 
This paper has reviewed the extant empirical literature on corporate governance 
and firm performance and finds that it is inconclusive. Moreover, the paper argues 
that one important reason for the present situation is that most researchers in the 
literature have not paid sufficient attention to the appropriate range of applicability of 
the available theoretical models. For example, the empirical literature that focuses on 
ownership structure and firm performance employs entrepreneurial models related to 
that in Jensen and Meckling (1976). Nevertheless, most researchers in the ownership 
structure/firm performance literature apply the entrepreneurial theory to managerial 
firms as well, as it is evidenced by the fact that they consider firms in which 
managerial ownership is close to zero percent. Conversely, the empirical work centred 
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on the relationship between board composition and firm performance, which is related 
to the managerial theory in Fama and Jensen (1983), not only does not make sure that 
the firms that are examined are strictly managerial, but it also ignores the alternative 
managerial AT theory concerning the agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). 
Furthermore, this paper argues that the recent empirical literature that studies the 
relationship between indices of anti-takeover provisions and firm performance lacks 
theory and it is plagued by problems of interpretation. For instance, researchers find 
difficulties to determine whether anti-takeover provisions cause poor firm 
performance or if it is the other way around. In addition, this paper has also discussed 
empirical work that employs comprehensive lists of corporate governance 
mechanisms. The paper finds that this literature also lacks a fully developed theory, 
and that the propositions put forward by these researchers are not consistent with the 
empirical evidence. 
With respect to the non-theoretical literature it is important to remember that 
causality belongs in the “conceptual domain”, that is, in the theoretical world as 
opposed to the real world of experience (Stewart, 1979, p. 73). In the real world, we 
may observe that on every occasion an event of type 1 occurs it is then followed by an 
event of type 2, but that is all we can perceive. As Stewart (1979, p. 65) puts it “a 
cause can never be observed”, if after observing the two events we “introduce the 
notion of ‛cause’, it can only be because we have done so out of our own heads.” It 
follows that the methodologically advisable way to proceed is to construct theories 
with causality included as a feature of each theory, and then try to disprove the 
different theories using empirical tests.   
Finally, two possibilities to avoid the drawbacks indicated above and facilitate 
future progress can be pointed out. First, the fact that there exist two types of AT 
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theory, entrepreneurial and managerial, suggests the possibility of a consolidated 
framework. In particular, researchers could adopt a firm lifecycle theory that includes 
relevant aspects of both entrepreneurial and managerial firms which would therefore 
be applicable to both kinds of firms (e.g. Mueller, 2003, pp. 80-82; Filatotchev and 
Wright, 2005, pp. 1-5). Moreover, by identifying the stages in the lifecycle of the firm 
at which antitakeover provisions are more heavily deployed this approach would go a 
long way in providing insight into the reasons behind the adoption of such provisions 
and the concomitant low firm performance.7 Second, another viable solution would be 
to develop criteria to determine whether firms are entrepreneurial or managerial and 
then apply the appropriate theories to samples of firms drawn using such benchmarks. 
Any of these two possibilities would go a long way in solving the present difficulties 
in the literature of corporate governance and firm performance. 
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